Abstract
The thesis aims to investigate Plato’s views on the possibility of akrasia in the Protagoras & Meno and the Republic, examine the consistency and conflicts between Plato’s views, and inspect the relationship between Socrates2’ and Aristotle’s views on akrasia. It is widely accepted that Plato denies the possibility of akrasia in the Protagoras & Meno but allows it in the Republic. I argue that Plato maintains the same view on the possibility of akrasia in the Protagoras & Meno and the Republic. My first argument is that what Plato denies in the Protagoras & Meno is the possibility of synchronic akrasia, but what he allows in the Republic is the possibility of diachronic akrasia, so it is just a verbal dispute and the assumed change of view does not exist. I secondly argue that the assumed akrasia in the Republic does not overturn the three presuppositions from which the denial of akrasia is inferred in the Protagoras & Meno. The three presuppositions include the invincible power of knowledge; no one errs willingly; all people desire what is good. Therefore, except for the verbal dispute, there are no real conflicts between Plato’s views in the Protagoras & Meno and the Republic. Furthermore, as to the relationship between Socrates3’ and Aristotle’s views on akrasia, I argue that Socrates denies the genuine case of akrasia while Aristotle allows it, because Socrates believes that knowledge will necessarily lead to actions while Aristotle believes that only the knowledge about particular things and perceptual things controls actions. However, they both agree that people do something contrary to what is best for them because of ignorance, though Socrates thinks that it is complete ignorance while Aristotle deems that it is partial ignorance.