Sammendrag
In the thesis I discuss the accommodationist claim that proportional
election systems can contribute in reducing the risk of intrastate
armed conflict in divided societies. I contend that if proportional
systems reduce the risk of conflict anywhere, it is where ethnic differences are salient - where there are severe ethnic conflicts to
absorb into politics. I look at groups that have large demographic
power on the one hand, or are marked by high levels of negative
horizontal economic inequality on the other. I discuss a theoretical
model unpacking central mechanisms suggested by conflict regulation
theory and comparative political science.
By the use of the rare events logistic model I find support for my
hypothesis that proportional election systems reduce the risk of conflict for relatively large ethnic groups. I hypothesize that economic inequality is less of a threat to peace under proportional systems than under majoritarian. The result from regression suggest the opposite: Increasing levels of inequality is a greater danger under proportional systems than under majoritarian. Further, my empirical investigation gives support to previous research contending that horizontal economic inequalities are a threat to intrastate peace. I also find that regulations allowing ethnic parties to compete for legislative power are associated with decline in conflict
risk. Moving beyond an interpretation of coefficient strength and
significance, I discover that the marginal effects of proportional
election systems are close to zero, contrary to the claims
of the advocates of both majoritarianism and proportionalism regarding
divided societies. My benign test evidences that neither the
majoritarian nor the proportional election system is superior; Any
reduction in risk of armed conflict induced by the election system is
negligible.