Sammendrag
Abstract
In this paper, we empirically examine the effectiveness of existed several economic instruments in 31 provinces in China and develop the ways that could control the industrial pollution effectively. Although the current pollution norms and the informal pressure have a
positive effect on controlling the water pollution in China, there are still some tasks we are supposed to do to improve the water quality. In this paper, the author suggests testing the
monitoring and enforcement efforts of city wastewater pollution control authorities, which are affected by local community characteristics that act as proxies for political power. We
utilize the dataset of plant-level annual emission data from 31 provinces in China to serve the model environmental pollution equilibrium. Use demand for residual disposal service and supply of residual disposal service to test the efficiency of the community on
government monitoring enforcement. And also it indicates the regulations; formal and informal have positive effects on pollution abatement. Develop the integrated ways that puts more emphasis on the combination of control and command approaches, market-based
approaches and the informal regulation with the cooperation of government, communities and the polluters.
Key words: equilibrium pollution, supply of residual disposal service, demand for residual disposal service, industrial pollution, informal regulation, control and command, tradable discharge permit (TDP), community, monitoring