Sammendrag
This thesis discusses and analyses the socialist rule of law project of the Communist Party of China (CPC), how the CPC is trying to construct a socialist rule of law state under the Xi Jinping-led CPC and the institutional dilemmas this project faces. These reforms are taking place within the framework of unitary power, and the CPC faces a set of dilemmas peculiar to this system of governance in its attempt to construct a socialist rule of law state. The main finding of this thesis is that China has, through the socialist rule of law project, formalised its decision-making system, strengthened accountability mechanisms and weakened informal authority. The Chinese socialist rule of law project differs from its counterparts in the former socialist states of Europe, the remaining socialist states and the liberal rule of law. Unlike the Communist Party of Vietnam, which has strengthened collective decision-making institutions at the expense of a single leader, the CPC seeks to empower the leader and centralise authority. Despite this, efforts have been made by the CPC to formalise decision-making processes at the central level. The socialist rule of law project has, however, had the most impact on the lower level of governance, which is now more rule-bound than earlier. Notwithstanding, Xi’s long-lasting leadership and the lack of proper accountability mechanisms over the central party leadership might hamper the socialist rule of law project in the long run.