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dc.contributor.authorHofmann, Bjørn
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-07T06:01:48Z
dc.date.available2023-11-07T06:01:48Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.citationBMC Medicine. 2023 Nov 06;21(1):419
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/105679
dc.description.abstractIs disease demotion more important than health promotion? The question is crucial for the ethos of medicine and for priority setting in healthcare. When things get tough, where should our attention and resources go: to health or disease? This study investigates two general perspectives on health and disease to address whether there is a stronger moral appeal from people’s disease than from their health. While naturalist conceptions of health and disease are mute on moral appeal, normativist conceptions give diverse answers. Classical utilitarianism provides a symmetrical view of health and disease, according to which we have an equally strong moral appeal to further health as we have to reduce disease. Other normativist positions argue that there is an asymmetry between health and disease providing substantial support for a stronger moral appeal from disease than from health. This has a wide range of radical implications, especially within priority setting. In particular, treatment, palliation, and prevention of disease should have priority to the promotion and enhancement of health.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsThe Author(s)
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.titleDoes disease incite a stronger moral appeal than health?
dc.typeJournal article
dc.date.updated2023-11-07T06:01:49Z
dc.creator.authorHofmann, Bjørn
dc.identifier.cristin2200732
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-023-03110-3
dc.type.documentTidsskriftartikkel
dc.type.peerreviewedPeer reviewed
dc.type.versionPublishedVersion
cristin.articleid419


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