| dc.description.abstract | Through causal-process tracing, this thesis explores how the Chadian regime dealt with the question of succession in the six months after Idriss Déby`s death. I accordance with an analytically eclectic approach I apply a reconceptualization of Cooper`s (2002) Gatekeeper theory, which I refer to as the Militarized Gatekeeper state. Through this lens I show how elite-cohesion manifest during a regime-threatening event. As local elites and external stakeholders, with vested interests in the regime`s survival perceive the regime to be threatened, they join ranks. The Chadian regime and senior members of the ruler`s winning coalition has relied upon a strategy of co-optation and repression, made possible by the explicit or implicit backing of the international community and their allies. This has allowed a relatively smooth hereditary succession and a period of consolidation under the son of the late president - paving the way for a possible Déby dynasty. The study highlights the importance of the patrimonial marketplace as tool of regime survival, and how the price of rents for members of the selectorate negatively correlates with regime-stability. The findings of this thesis reiterate the need to understand these militaristic hybrid regimes, who often rule by the financing and support of geostrategic partners. This study has empirically shown how the Chadian military is the de-facto body in control of the Chadian government. The control and ability to project power through the military apparatus is the cornerstone of the regime in N`Djamena. Lastly, the findings of this thesis reiterate the need to understand these militaristic hybrid regimes, who often rule by the financing and support of geostrategic partners. | eng |