Axiological ethical economics: Ecosystem services, pluralistic valuation, and the problems of neoclassical thought

Abstract

In this thesis I engage with the philosophical and theoretical assumptions of mainstream economic thinking, and how these related to the concept of ecosystem services (ES). I argue that dominant economic methods of valuation are inadequate for valuing ES as environmental goods. The problem with these methods comes down to the philosophical assumptions made by mainstream economic theory about which type of values are important and can be assessed. I argue that mainstream economic valuation methods focus exclusively on the monetary values of goods and services, that is, the value they have when exchanged. Problematically for such valuation methods though, I attempt to show that ES take on the form of a flow which does not directly produce, or correlate with, a tradeable good or service. Because of this, I hold that they do not provide any adequate basis for mainstream methods to assign values to them. These assumptions lead to the failure of current dominant economic approaches in recognizing the vital importance of ES, as existential conditions both for the economy and humanity. While the main part of the thesis focuses on these insights about mainstream economics, I attempt to outline the possibility of an alternative economic approach based on insights contemporary environmental ethics. This approach leverages the fundamental issues with how dominant economics relate to values, to outline a framework which avoids making the same mistakes.