Two Senses of Freedom (Epictetus on the Will)

Abstract

What conception of freedom is expressed in the thought of Epictetus? In this essay, I argue that there are two different ways in which the will can be said to be free for Epictetus. The first is that the will is free by nature (freedom of autonomy). The will is autonomously free because it is inherently self-governed and cannot be ruled by anything or anyone else. The second kind of freedom is about the will being free from bad choices (freedom of wisdom). This freedom is about happiness. It is the freedom of the wise will that is not ruled by unruly passions or false beliefs. Every will is by nature autonomously free to choose as it may, but only a few wills are free in the wise and happy sense. Although it has not been sufficiently recognized hitherto, I argue that Epictetus’ main contribution to the conceptual development of the notion of free will was autonomous freedom since he through that notion made every human being free to pursue wise freedom.