Skjul metadata

dc.date.accessioned2021-12-18T18:33:56Z
dc.date.available2021-12-18T18:33:56Z
dc.date.created2021-11-26T09:27:06Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationGrepperud, Sverre Ole Pedersen, Pål Andreas . First and second mover advantages and the degree of conflicting interests. Managerial and Decision Economics (MDE). 2021
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/89647
dc.description.abstractWe introduce games consisting of two players where each player's payoff might be differently affected by changes in the decision variable of the rival. The games are classified into three categories: The high-conflict category is characterized by both players having a first mover advantage, the medium-conflict category by (at least) one player having a first mover advantage, and, the low-conflict category by (at least) one player having a second mover advantage. The categories give rise to different equilibria in a prior game where the players are supposed to commit themselves to draw as early or as late as possible.
dc.languageEN
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleFirst and second mover advantages and the degree of conflicting interests
dc.typeJournal article
dc.creator.authorGrepperud, Sverre Ole
dc.creator.authorPedersen, Pål Andreas
cristin.unitcode185,52,11,0
cristin.unitnameAvdeling for helseledelse og helseøkonomi
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1
dc.identifier.cristin1959525
dc.identifier.bibliographiccitationinfo:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=Managerial and Decision Economics (MDE)&rft.volume=&rft.spage=&rft.date=2021
dc.identifier.jtitleManagerial and Decision Economics (MDE)
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3494
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-92242
dc.type.documentTidsskriftartikkel
dc.type.peerreviewedPeer reviewed
dc.source.issn0143-6570
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/89647/4/10-1002mde-3494.pdf
dc.type.versionPublishedVersion


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Dette verket har følgende lisens: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International