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dc.date.accessioned2021-12-10T13:14:08Z
dc.date.available2021-12-10T13:14:08Z
dc.date.created2021-11-21T22:32:22Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationFritz, Peter . Ground and Grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2021
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/89498
dc.description.abstractCurrent views of metaphysical ground suggest that a true conjunction is immediately grounded in its conjuncts, and only its conjuncts. Similar principles are suggested for disjunction and universal quantification. Here, it is shown that these principles are jointly inconsistent: They require that there is a distinct truth for any plurality of truths. By a variant of Cantor’s Theorem, such a fine-grained individuation of truths is inconsistent. This shows that the notion of grounding is either not in good standing, or that natural assumptions about it need to be revised.
dc.languageEN
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.titleGround and Grain
dc.typeJournal article
dc.creator.authorFritz, Peter
cristin.unitcode185,14,33,20
cristin.unitnameFilosofi
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2
dc.identifier.cristin1957013
dc.identifier.bibliographiccitationinfo:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research&rft.volume=&rft.spage=&rft.date=2021
dc.identifier.jtitlePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12822
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-92113
dc.type.documentTidsskriftartikkel
dc.type.peerreviewedPeer reviewed
dc.source.issn0031-8205
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/89498/2/online%2Bfirst.pdf
dc.type.versionPublishedVersion


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