dc.description.abstract | Humanity’s insufficient attempts at reducing carbon emissions to prevent runaway climate change have inspired some to propose that we “engineer” the climate-system; large-scale technological interventions, with the aim to manage solar radiation and remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, could possibly keep dangerous global warming at bay – at least as a last resort if conventional mitigation efforts fail. However, such “geoengineering” could also possibly involve violations of someone’s moral rights. If so, should we do it anyway, despite rights infringement? Or should we refrain out of concern for the moral rights of affected groups or individuals, even if geoengineering could effectively prevent or minimize harmful effects of ongoing climate change? To pose the question more generally: Are there moral rights which could, in principle, block effective climate policies? In this thesis, I attempt to answer these questions in two steps: First, I defend a theory of normative ethics. Then, I apply it to a “geoengineering vs. rights” scenario. Specifically, I defend a formulation of Utilitarianism which emphasizes moral rules, and discourages calculation of consequences under normal circumstances, but recommends being cognizant that general moral rules can justifiably be broken under exceptional circumstances if the principle of utility clearly demands it. This translates to the conclusions that rights claims could, in principle, be set aside by policymakers to prevent significantly greater harms or losses, and that emergency geoengineering can’t be ruled out as unethical out of hand. I argue that – other than the overriding concern to maximize the sum total of net pleasure in the experienceable universe – there are no strict moral limits on climate policy, but that humans, given our inherent epistemic barriers, would be wise to downplay this fact and limit ourselves under most circumstances, for example by formulating and adhering to what I call “Rules (of thumb)” – heuristic devices, informed by the principle of utility, which could helpfully guide us in practical moral reasoning. I propose some Rules (of thumb) for policymakers considering geoengineering schemes. | eng |