Tensions in Objectives. Comparing U.S. Counterproliferation Pressure Campaigns Re Iran and North Korea

Abstract

This thesis identifies tensions in objectives that inform U.S. policies in counterproliferation campaigns, and traces how tensions in objectives (U.S.) affect the stated goals of pressure campaigns: freeze, stop, or roll back. Two at times competing objectives in U.S. counterproliferation are identified. The first objective a) is to pressure, contain or isolate powers that are perceived as hostile. The second objective b) is to limit or slow nuclear proliferation. Insights from previous studies suggest that when the U.S. places more weight on objective b) the U.S. may settle for less in terms of stated goals, in turn if they weight objective a) as more important, the opposite may appear; that stated goals are maximized. This thesis provides a comparative case study of four highly relevant cases of U.S. counterproliferation campaigns re North Korea and Iran and in three cases finds that when objective b) was prioritized, the U.S. dialed down its goals from a nuclear stop/rollback to a nuclear freeze, in order to achieve a nuclear agreement. When the U.S. placed more weight on objective a), the U.S. dialed up stated goals to nuclear stop/rollback. In one case, despite that more weight was placed on objective b), the U.S. maintained the goal of a nuclear stop/rollback. The U.S. under Clinton prioritized objective b) in response to the first nuclear crisis with North Korea and negotiated a nuclear freeze in the Agreed Framework (AF). When North Korea was revealed to have a clandestine nuclear program, more weight was placed on objective a). North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006 and Iran over the following years massively increased its uranium enrichment. Observing this, the U.S. under Obama decided on a policy most effective in reaching objective b) with Iran, which was a major policy shift in this context. The administration succeeded in negotiating a nuclear freeze with the JCPOA. The deal was attacked by Obamas critics in the U.S. for easing pressure on Iran. The Trump administration left the JCPOA in 2018 and issued “maximum pressure” on Iran, prioritizing objective a). Iran again increased its uranium enrichment despite U.S. pressure crippling its economy. The U.S. under Trump prioritized objective b) with North Korea, but the case differs in one regard: That North Korea in 2017 already had nuclear weapons, a fact that the U.S. formally does not recognize. In this case objective b) was prioritized, but the U.S. maintained the goal of a nuclear stop/rollback.