dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-06T19:05:34Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-06T19:05:34Z | |
dc.date.created | 2020-11-03T16:01:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Räsänen, Joona . Against the impairment argument: A reply to Hendricks. Bioethics. 2020, 34(8), 862-864 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10852/80886 | |
dc.description.abstract | In an article of this journal, Perry Hendricks makes a novel argument for the immorality of abortion. According to his impairment argument, abortion is immoral because: (a) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the nth degree, such as causing the fetus to have fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS); (b) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the n+1 degree (to cause the fetus to be more impaired than to have FAS); (c) killing the fetus impairs the fetus to the n+1 degree (causes it to be more impaired than to have FAS); (d) abortion kills the fetus; (e) therefore, abortion is immoral. The impairment argument is a promising account for the wrongness of abortion because it does not rely on the controversial metaphysical premise that a fetus is a person. This article aims to show, that despite some immediate advantages over the rival theories of the immorality of abortion there is a reason to believe that the impairment argument is untenable. That is because there are goods that can be achieved by abortion but that cannot be achieved by impairing the fetus. | en_US |
dc.language | EN | |
dc.rights | Attribution 4.0 International | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
dc.title | Against the impairment argument: A reply to Hendricks | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.creator.author | Räsänen, Joona | |
cristin.unitcode | 185,14,33,0 | |
cristin.unitname | Institutt for filosofi, idé- og kunsthistorie og klassiske språk | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1844619 | |
dc.identifier.bibliographiccitation | info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=Bioethics&rft.volume=34&rft.spage=862&rft.date=2020 | |
dc.identifier.jtitle | Bioethics | |
dc.identifier.volume | 34 | |
dc.identifier.issue | 8 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 862 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 864 | |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12720 | |
dc.identifier.urn | URN:NBN:no-83969 | |
dc.type.document | Tidsskriftartikkel | en_US |
dc.type.peerreviewed | Peer reviewed | |
dc.source.issn | 0269-9702 | |
dc.identifier.fulltext | Fulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/80886/1/R%25C3%25A4s%25C3%25A4nen%2BJ%2BAgainst%2Bthe%2Bimpairment%2Bargument.pdf | |
dc.type.version | PublishedVersion | |