“Knowledge as Recollection in Plato’s Meno”

Abstract

This dissertation investigates Plato’s epistemology in the Meno. In this dialogue, Plato presents, among others, Meno’s paradox, the theory of recollection, and his statement that knowledge is true belief with an explanatory account. Through this dissertation’s analysis, it becomes evident that the famous Meno’s paradox does not take into consideration all possible cognitive states prior to the commencement of investigation. Meno presents his paradox having in mind the case that one is totally ignorant and has no beliefs on the subject matter, in other words, that one is in a cognitive blank. Socrates comes to prove that inquiry and discovery are possible by means of recollection demonstrating his point via one of Meno’s servants. The doubts as to whether recollection occurs during the whole demonstration or only during some stages of it are elucidated by the given analysis proving that the whole exchange between Socrates and Meno’s slave could be described as a complete process of recollection. The method that Socrates uses in the Meno, namely the elenchus, is proven to be neither destructive nor negative for his interlocutors but rather constructive by provoking new impetus for further inquiry.