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dc.date.accessioned2020-05-16T19:27:22Z
dc.date.available2020-05-16T19:27:22Z
dc.date.created2019-10-15T16:54:20Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationEifring, Halvor Bøyesen . Spontaneous thought and early Chinese ideas of `non-action? and `emotion?. Asian Philosophy. 2019, 1-24
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/75822
dc.description.abstractThe early Chinese idea of non-action refers not to spontaneity, as has been argued, but to a relation between agency and spontaneity. Non-action needs to be seen in connection with the idea of emotion, which refers to the spontaneity involved. The debates surrounding non-action and emotion can be profitably compared to discussions of spontaneous thought in modern cognitive science. Early Chinese approaches supplement modern ideas by focusing on feelings rather than thought and by being more relational and ecological, seeing agency and spontaneity as parallel processes in constant interaction rather than mutually exclusive categories. Furthermore, emotions represent an inner counterpart to the external changes in our physical and social environment, pointing to a close connection between the nature within us and outside us. On a larger scale, therefore, non-action denotes a relation between deliberate action and the given internal and external situation within which such action takes place.
dc.languageEN
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleSpontaneous thought and early Chinese ideas of `non-action? and `emotion?
dc.typeJournal article
dc.creator.authorEifring, Halvor Bøyesen
cristin.unitcode185,14,32,85
cristin.unitnameKinastudier
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2
dc.identifier.cristin1737320
dc.identifier.bibliographiccitationinfo:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=Asian Philosophy&rft.volume=&rft.spage=1&rft.date=2019
dc.identifier.jtitleAsian Philosophy
dc.identifier.volume29
dc.identifier.issue3
dc.identifier.startpage177
dc.identifier.endpage200
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2019.1653528
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-78838
dc.type.documentTidsskriftartikkel
dc.type.peerreviewedPeer reviewed
dc.source.issn0955-2367
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/75822/2/Spontaneous%2Bthought%2Band%2Bearly%2BChinese%2Bideas%2Bof%2Bnon%2Baction%2Band%2Bemotion.pdf
dc.type.versionPublishedVersion


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
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