Abstract
This thesis analyses the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2013 members of the WTO adopted the first multilateral trade agreement since the WTO was established in 1995. The adoption of the agreement marked the end of 17 years of discussions, and nine years of negotiations. With the stagnation of the Doha round of negotiations as a backdrop, this thesis investigates how and why members were able to reach an agreement on trade facilitation. By investigating why the TFA was adopted, and why it was adopted in its specific form, this thesis challenges the conventional wisdom about the dynamics of negotiations within the WTO. Drawing on institutional theory, this thesis finds that the TFA was adopted because members wanted to reduce the collective action dilemmas associated with un-harmonized customs systems. Furthermore, the negotiations in the WTO affected how actors’ rated their options, which again affected the dynamics of the negotiations. Throughout the negotiations, members relied on the expertise and authority of other organizations within the trade facilitation field. The final agreement mirrors this reliance, as well as being the legacy of enduring political struggles for influence.