Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: A history of balancing, bandwagoning and hedging

Abstract

In the context of China’s rise and the great power struggle in Southeast Asia (SEA), the actions taken by small SEA states in dealing with China may be characterized as either cooperation (bandwagon) or challenging (balancing), or a mixture of both (hedging). The drivers or motivations behind these courses of action is the focus of this study. Questions to be answered are; what are the main drivers behind SEA countries’ choice to balance, bandwagon or hedge? And can a model be developed based on a select number of drivers, for predicting whether a state will balance against or bandwagon with China – or do a little bit of each (hedging)? This thesis aims to uncover the predictive capability of several key factors (drivers for balancing and bandwagoning) to determine if each SEA states will balance against China, bandwagon with it or hedge its bets. In doing so, the thesis’ goal is to identify the most consistent (and least consistent) “drivers” for balancing and bandwagoning in determining states’ relations with China and therefore produce a model that is able to, as best as it can, to accurately categorize states’ alignment by measuring the strength of certain drivers. The thesis aims to achieve this by studying patterns of behavior and through historical analysis of each SEA state within the context of different drivers/motivations for balancing and bandwagoning in the time span of the past three decades. The results of this historical analysis within set variables may hopefully contribute to further understanding and identifying contexts for small states’ alignment with a great power.