Leibniz's Ontological Arguments: How Existence Prevails over Non-Existence in Leibniz’s Metaphysics

Abstract

This thesis is a study of Leibniz’s ontological arguments for the existence of God and a discussion of their bearing on his metaphysics. I argue that the Leibnizian metaphysical system is fundamentally inclined towards existence, and that the reason for this is to be found in his concept of God, or ‘the being for whom being possible suffices for being actual’. In the first chapter, I present the development in Leibniz’s strategy of argument. Initially, Leibniz argues that God’s essence contains existence because he is perfect; later, after serious methodological doubts, he argues that existence follows from God’s essence because he is necessary. The latter strategy is based on the intuition that essence is a tendency to exist. This intuition finds two related expressions, the exigentia-doctrine and the Doctrine of Striving Possibles, both of which I discuss in the second chapter. In the third chapter, I examine how Leibniz uses the conviction that all possible things exist unless they are hindered to explain why God’s existence is necessary. I argue that the result is a metaphysical system in which existence is fundamentally favoured. In light of this conclusion, I disagree with Brandon C. Look’s (2013) associating Leibniz with the belief that nothingness would be a more natural state of affairs.