Away from NATO toward Russia? Turkey’s Quest for Security, Autonomy and Regional Power Status

Abstract

This thesis analyzes Turkey’s security policies toward Russia, the US and NATO with a focus on two cases: Syria (2011-2018) and the Black Sea region (2014-2018). It employs Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory (1987) and Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) conceptual models Rational Choice, Organizational Behavior and Governmental Politics. The reader gains increased knowledge of alliance theory, security diversification and emerging middle power activism. Turkey’s relations with the EU, US and NATO quickly deteriorated following the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016 against President Erdogan’s AKP government, which triggered a major reshuffling of government personnel. Conversely, Turkey increased security cooperation with Russia since mid-2016 as part of their rapprochement process (after the November 2015 fighter jet incident in Syria). Ankara agreed to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense system (incompatible with NATO’s defense architecture) and joined the Russia-led Astana peace talks to solve the Syrian conflict. Consequently, Western journalists and analysts claimed Turkey is ‘drifting’ away from NATO toward Russia and warned the West may ‘lose Turkey.’ This thesis argues that Turkey’s recent turn toward Russia is mainly due to deteriorating relations with the US in Syria and the 2016 post-coup purge, which gave rise to Russia-friendly actors at the expense of pro-Western elements. Yet, in the long term, accommodating Russia neither fulfills Ankara’s goals of security, autonomy nor regional power status. Russia’s 2014 annexation and subsequent militarization of Crimea changed the regional balance of power in the Black Sea. Crimea then emerged as a logistics hub supplying Russia’s military campaign in Syria (since September 2015), where it bolstered Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Witnessing an increased Russian military presence in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean that may challenge its sovereignty, Turkey (as a rational actor) must balance and cannot bandwagon with Russia. Therefore, it will remain anchored in NATO in the foreseeable future.