Getting It Right: World Bank Statebuilding Efforts in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. A Study of Reformed FCS Programs

Abstract

This thesis seeks to uncover whether reformed World Bank statebuilding efforts in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) are producing satisfactory results. Fragile and conflict-affected states are known to be particularly tough contexts in which to conduct statebuilding and development, due exactly to the very factors that cause and sustain their fragility; weak institutional capacity and the inability or unwillingness to offer services to the people. After taking criticism both from observers in the development community and from within its own organization in the early 2000s, the World Bank reformed its statebuilding programs in fragile and conflict-affected states. Evaluations of these efforts show that the early takeaway is that the reformed programs are still failing to meet the goals of improving capacity and governance. I look at the concrete findings of such evaluations in order to shed light on why the World Bank is not succeeding to the extent one would expect. I use Liberia and Sierra Leone as examples throughout in order to gain insight into what the lessons are at the local level. I find that while there is some progress, the World Bank is failing to live up to its own ambitions and goals for statebuilding programs, resulting in programs that are often irrelevant to the local context and unsustainable for the future. In many respects, the World Bank is simply not following its own recommendations or strategies for how programs should be implemented. It is failing both to evaluate programs upon completion and to incorporate the few fragility analyses it conducts into programs. Thus, the World Bank continues to have too little sensitivity to local contexts and their needs.