| dc.description.abstract | After the Cold War, the overall patterns of warfare and armed conflicts changed. Consequently, in order to meet the new threats to international peace and security, the United Nations (UN) had to revise its strategy. In the 1992 Agenda for Peace, the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali highlighted that the UN should reach out for help from regional organizations in order to strengthen its capacity and to make peace operations more efficient. Nevertheless, the relationship between the UN and regional organizations has never been formalized. Because there are both pros and cons with peace operations conducted by the UN and regional organizations, I argue that they should seek to complement each other. Nonetheless, it is not a prerequisite for a successful outcome. Through an extensive analysis and comparison of the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the UN in the civil war in Somalia and the relationship between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN in the civil wars in Liberia, this thesis seeks to understand how regional organizations can succeed in peace operations in collaboration with the UN, and how they can work together more efficiently. Based on the findings in the analysis, this thesis concludes that regional hegemons can play a crucial role in peace operations, both politically, militarily and financially. However, it is not guaranteed that the regional hegemon will act in the interest of the country in which it is intervening. Moreover, I argue that the UN and regional organizations need to have a common worldview in order to succeed in a peace operation and that they need to agree on a common implementation plan in which they specify the division of tasks in order to secure an efficient collaboration. Finally, I have concluded that they need to agree on a budget based on the resources and knowledge available for them before deploying the troops. | eng |