Moral motivation from fetishism? - A metaethical discussion of Michael Smith's fetishist argument

Abstract

Michael Smith argues that “a change in moral motivation follows reliably in a change in moral judgements, at least in the good and strong-willed person” (1994:71). He illustrates this change with two people engaged in an argument about a fundamental moral question, and a short summary of this discussion is that B manages to talk A into voting for another political party than he intended to do before he engaged in the conversation with B, with the result of A changing his most fundamental values (1994:71). According to Smith, if A is a good and strong-willed person, “a new motivation will follow in the wake of his new judgment” (1994:72). The connection between changes in moral judgments and motivation is either explained internally, the moral judgment itself, or externally, “from the content of the motivational dispositions possessed by the good and strong-willed person” (1994:71). Smith argues against the externalist account, stating that “the strong externalist’s explanation commits us to false views of the content of a good person’s motivation; it elevates a moral fetish into the one and only moral virtue” (1994:76). My aim with this thesis is to give an interpretation and clarification of Smith’s fetishist argument against externalism which consists of three closely connected themes: desire de dicto/desire de re, the reliable connection, and the good and strong-willed person. The chapters are therefore presented in the thematic order of the themes which the argument consists of: chapter 3 presents Smith’s argument, chapter 4 gives a thematic discussion of the criticism against the argument, and chapter 5 presents the defence of the argument against the criticism. The final chapter follows the same thematic structure and gives an evaluation of Smith’s fetishist argument. If Smith’s argument should be considered successful, what he argues about all the three themes must be true. I argue that this is not the case, and my aim is to explain why Smith’s reductio of externalism fails due to the combination of the three themes his fetishist argument consists of.