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dc.date.accessioned2018-02-05T14:39:14Z
dc.date.available2018-02-05T14:39:14Z
dc.date.created2016-02-01T15:15:10Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationFritz, Peter . Propositional Contingentism. The Review of Symbolic Logic. 2016, 9(1), 123-142
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/59855
dc.description.abstractAccording to propositional contingentism, it is contingent what propositions there are. This paper presents two ways of modeling contingency in what propositions there are using two classes of possible worlds models. The two classes of models are shown to be equivalent as models of contingency in what propositions there are, although they differ as to which other aspects of reality they represent. These constructions are based on recent work by Robert Stalnaker; the aim of this paper is to explain, expand, and, in one aspect, correct Stalnaker’s discussion. COPYRIGHT: © Association for Symbolic Logic 2015en_US
dc.languageEN
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titlePropositional Contingentismen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.creator.authorFritz, Peter
cristin.unitcode185,14,33,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for filosofi, idé- og kunsthistorie og klassiske språk
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2
dc.identifier.cristin1330189
dc.identifier.bibliographiccitationinfo:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=The Review of Symbolic Logic&rft.volume=9&rft.spage=123&rft.date=2016
dc.identifier.jtitleThe Review of Symbolic Logic
dc.identifier.volume9
dc.identifier.issue1
dc.identifier.startpage123
dc.identifier.endpage142
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755020315000325
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-62537
dc.type.documentTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.type.peerreviewedPeer reviewed
dc.source.issn1755-0203
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/59855/2/published1533.pdf
dc.type.versionPublishedVersion


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