Phenomenology and Intentionality: On the Direction of Explanation in Conscious Visual States

Abstract

Perhaps the two most important research topics in philosophy of mind today are phenomenal consciousness and intentionality, the central question being how to account for these phenomena in a physical world. Closely connected is the question of whether these two aspects of the mind could be explanatory related. This is the topic of my thesis, and more precisely the question is this: Is there any explanatory relationship holding between the phenomenal properties and the representational properties of conscious visual states? This question admits of four answers: (1) the two property domains are not two but one (Identity); (2) they are distinct but explanatory independent (Independence); (3) phenomenal properties have explanatory priority (Phenomenology-first); or (4) representational properties have explanatory priority (Intentionality-first). How should we understand (3) and (4), the priority- views? Part of this thesis consists of presenting my preferred way of understanding Phenomenology-first and Intentionality-first. I argue that they are best captured by the grounding notion. Mere modal ideology will not capture the strict metaphysical priority that goes with explanatory priority. We need to invoke hyperintensional notions to understand these views. The result of my research is the formulation and clarification of what I take to be the best reasons there are for thinking that each of the four possible answers posed above is true. That is, I argue for a number of conditional claims: Which of the positions you should hold, dependent on various other views you might have.