| dc.description.abstract | The war in eastern Ukraine and the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, have led to a significant worsening of the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Russia. The Russian willingness to use force to redraw borders in Europe and to support unrest in eastern Ukraine, have created a sense of uncertainty and fear not seen since the Cold War. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, did United States and Russian officials agree on defining each other as a threat to their national security. The events in Ukraine have forced NATO to reassess its relationship to Russia. NATO has discarded the two pillars of the post-Cold War relationship with Russia, dialogue and cooperation, and embarked on heavy reforms to enhance its defence of its eastern flank. Since then, both sides have expanded their military activity significantly. The increased military activity, and a worryingly high number of dangerous close encounters between the armed forces of NATO-member states and Russia, have given a rise to an increased risk of accidents or miscalculations that could escalate tensions. Observers have consequently warned that NATO and Russia are in an unstable and dangerous security dilemma. Unsatisfied with the reforms taken at the Wales Summit of 2014, NATO’s eastern members have called for more military presence and defence in their region to deter further Russian aggression. In the NATO Summit in Warsaw 2016, did the Alliance agree on a new strategy of deterrence and dialogue towards Russia. The strategy closely resembles the two pillars of Atlantic security during the Cold War; deterrence to deter a possibly expansionist Russia from aggressive actions, and dialogue (or détente as it was called back then) to reduce the tensions and to reassure a potentially frightened Russia. This master thesis is meant to answer what this dual-track strategy of deterrence and dialogue is, and how NATO employs the strategy. | eng |