The 1953 Coup in Iran, And the U.S. Decision to Overthrow Mohammad Mossadeq

Abstract

This study examines U.S. foreign policy towards Iran, in the first years of Eisenhower’s presidency. With a focus on the 1953 coup d’état in Iran, where the CIA overthrew the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in August 1953. Specifically, the study analyses the U.S. decision to opt for the coup. Surrounding the question of why the coup, there is an ongoing scholarly controversy, with distinguished Professors and scholars presenting compelling arguments for both sides. Because there is such a controversy in the literature, the thesis argues the subject is worth revisiting. Fundamentally, the study seeks to answer two questions. Firstly, why did Eisenhower and his administration opt for a coup d’état in Iran in 1953? On this question, the thesis will argue that the U.S. feared the repercussions Iranian nationalization could have on other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East, thus motivating Eisenhower and his administration to overthrow Mossadeq. Secondly, does the true motivation to overthrow Mossadeq manifest itself in the coup’s aftermath? The thesis presume the United States had a goal with the coup, something they wanted to achieve. Can this be seen in their policy towards Iran after the coup? Here the thesis will argue that yes, the U.S. focus on the repercussions of the new oil settlement, and how this settlement could not give Iran greater profits than other oil producing countries – gives legitimacy to the argument that fear of repercussions elsewhere, was the true motivation to overthrow Mossadeq in 1953.