| dc.description.abstract | In recent years, nonviolent conflict has increasingly captured both popular and academic attention. One established feature of nonviolent conflict is intriguing; it often arises in highly repressive circumstances commonly thought to hinder collective action. It is this incongruence between theory and empirics I seek to illuminate. Thus, it is the aim of the thesis to contribute both to the repression literature and the nascent quantitative research on nonviolent campaign onset. I propose an integrated theoretical framework based on two of the major theories of conflict onset, grievance theory and political opportunity structure approaches. Although these are often depicted as opposing, I contend that they are in fact complementary. I further suggest that conflict arises based on a grievance-opportunity function, in which it is the changes in either grievances or opportunities that induce contentious action, of which repression can be both. Thus, the research question is does repressive instability increase the likelihood of nonviolent conflict? I put forth seven hypotheses, four of which are tested on annual data for 149 states between 1972 and 2006. The analysis finds empirical evidence that liberalization of civil liberties repression increases the likelihood of nonviolent conflict onset, though it does not have a significant effect upon violent conflict. Thus, the results conform to other quantitative studies of nonviolent conflict in emphasizing that the causes of violent and nonviolent conflicts are fundamentally different. Furthermore, the findings in this thesis suggest that the present inconclusive efforts to establish a unitary effect of repression upon dissent may be aided by accounting for the many facets and possible effects of the concept of repression. | eng |