dc.contributor.author | Vikesdal, Sara Kasin | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-09-21T22:00:56Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-09-21T22:00:56Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Vikesdal, Sara Kasin. Against Sainsbury and Tye s Originalism: A Critical Investigation of an Originalist Theory of Concepts and Thoughts. Master thesis, University of Oslo, 2015 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10852/46082 | |
dc.description.abstract | In Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them Sainsbury and Tye defend a version of originalism, the view that concepts are to be individuated by way of their origins. A consequence of their account is that concepts that are semantically distinct may nonetheless be of the same type (and vice versa). In this thesis I argue that a result of this commitment is that their account fails as a general theory of concepts and thoughts. I show by appeal to a thought experiment that Sainsbury and Tye s originalism cannot provide a general account of the cognitive role of concepts and thoughts: the theory fails to explain certain cases of rationality. Further, I show that originalism fails at the specific task of solving three classical puzzles within the philosophy of mind and language; puzzles the solution of which is the raison d'être of originalism. | eng |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.subject | Philosophy | |
dc.subject | of | |
dc.subject | mind | |
dc.subject | Originalism | |
dc.subject | Mental | |
dc.subject | files | |
dc.subject | Concepts | |
dc.subject | Thoughts | |
dc.title | Against Sainsbury and Tye's Originalism: A Critical Investigation of an Originalist Theory of Concepts and Thoughts | eng |
dc.type | Master thesis | |
dc.date.updated | 2015-09-21T22:00:56Z | |
dc.creator.author | Vikesdal, Sara Kasin | |
dc.identifier.urn | URN:NBN:no-50284 | |
dc.type.document | Masteroppgave | |
dc.identifier.fulltext | Fulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/46082/1/Vikesdal-Master.pdf | |