Abstract
In most states, the decennial redistricting is done through a legislative process. This means that lawmakers decide on how electoral districts are formed. This also means that the lawmakers get to choose or reject their electors, which is not compatible with several definitions of democracy. In some states reforms are implemented either through ballot initiatives or court actions. Scholars have demonstrated that removing the control of this redistricting process from the lawmakers will increase electoral competition. There are, however, those who argue — before the U. S. Supreme Court — that such instances of direct democracy is against the intents of the Founding Fathers and thereby unconstitutional. This thesis explores the origins and development of partisan redistricting, the undemocratic aspects of it, and whether such an increase in electoral competition is traceable in the 2012 election to the U. S. House of Representatives. It shows that there is a very small difference between reelection rates in legislature-drawn districts and in districts drawn by commissions. An argument is made, that revising the redistricting process is a matter of political culture more than of constitutional law, and that the strongest arguments for a revision of state redistricting procedures are normative — not numerical. The analysis of election results in states with different redistricting procedures indicates that there is not any statistically significant difference in incumbent reelection rates, but that the dataset is too small to lend serious weight to any side of the argument.