A Dangerous Sideshow. The US and the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1976.

Abstract

This thesis is about the US and the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1976. The thesis follows US President Gerald R. Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from January 1975, a few months before the civil war broke out. The thesis ends on the eve of June 1, 1976, when Syrian President Hafez al-Assad launched a military intervention into Lebanon. The thesis shows how Lebanon in itself was of little interest to the US. The Lebanese civil war did not rise to the forefront of Washington s attention until it was a perceived as a threat to Kissinger s diplomatic framework in the Middle East. In October 1975, Washington reasoned that a Syrian intervention into Lebanon would be followed by an Israeli counter-intervention, or vice versa. Kissinger and his fellow policymakers thought a dual intervention was likely to cause an Arab-Israeli war, which would thwart Washington s effort in the Middle East. To the US, the Lebanese Civil War was a dangerous sideshow to Kissinger s Middle Eastern diplomacy. In the middle of March 1976 the US learned that Syria was going to intervene in Lebanon. Washington tried different approaches to prevent the situation from turning into a regional war. When Syria intervened in Lebanon on June 1, 1976, there was no Israeli counter-intervention. The thesis looks at the US role in the turn of events that led up to the June 1 intervention.

This thesis is about the US and the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1976. The thesis follows US President Gerald R. Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from January 1975, a few months before the civil war broke out. The thesis ends on the eve of June 1, 1976, when Syrian President Hafez al-Assad launched a military intervention into Lebanon. The thesis shows how Lebanon in itself was of little interest to the US. The Lebanese civil war did not rise to the forefront of Washington s attention until it was a perceived as a threat to Kissinger s diplomatic framework in the Middle East. In October 1975, Washington reasoned that a Syrian intervention into Lebanon would be followed by an Israeli counter-intervention, or vice versa. Kissinger and his fellow policymakers thought a dual intervention was likely to cause an Arab-Israeli war, which would thwart Washington s effort in the Middle East. To the US, the Lebanese Civil War was a dangerous sideshow to Kissinger s Middle Eastern diplomacy. In the middle of March 1976 the US learned that Syria was going to intervene in Lebanon. Washington tried different approaches to prevent the situation from turning into a regional war. When Syria intervened in Lebanon on June 1, 1976, there was no Israeli counter-intervention. The thesis looks at the US role in the turn of events that led up to the June 1 intervention.