| dc.description.abstract | The objective of this investigation is to focus on the morality of the modern self and how the quality (significant form) of this morality is conditioned by and reflects its socio-historical and socio-cultural frames, and how in fact the Self is shaped by its social context to such a degree that morality is disturbed. One of the prime features of modern life and naturally a key element in the approach to contemporary morality is individualism. Hence individualism is one of the first sources of concern. Repeatedly throughout the history of modern critical thinking there has been expressed concern on behalf of human meaning and morality regarding the rise of individualism as one of the primary objectives in modern life, and perhaps as an overall life orientation. This development has according to Tocqueville deprived life of one of its heroic dimensions, man does not any longer regard himself as part of something bigger, life does not any longer have a higher purpose the highest and most important (or even the only) purpose is les petites et vulgaires plaisirs (AE; 17). The last men as presented by Nietzsche in Also Sprach Zarathustra are the final, most vulgar of the vulgar finding no other meaning in life than seeking pathetic pleasures and comfort. Their arrogance in this respect is surpassed only by their ignorance. One should keep in mind though that Nietzsche often covers the topics with broad strokes of paint losing some of the detailed specificity required to pinpoint phenomena accurately, but never the less he puts his finger on the essentials, that modern life lacks elements of meaning and direction, and that the most prominent human devotion is comfort.
To this approach one may object that one cannot reduce modern man to individualism alone, nor can one reduce individualism to self-assuring, comfort-seeking ignorance. And furthermore, individualism cannot be viewed isolated from instrumental rationality, from democratic and liberalistic ideology, from market economy and monetary systems, from bureaucracy or any other process, which as a whole sums in the modern, contemporary culture and which therefore should as well be paid attention to in questioning morality. To this objection I will respond that this is true, one cannot view individualism isolated in order to understand its history and its significance to that specific culture in which it reigns, nor can one judge an entire culture from one of its features only, disregarding all the other, intimately interrelated cultural features. But I regard individualism as the prior, most basic principle in modern life orientation and life performance, prior to instrumental rationality, prior to democracy and bureaucracy, prior to political or ideological orientation - hence its privileged status in this investigation. Furthermore, my intention in emphasising individualism is not to reduce man to pure individualism in order to support some moralistic crusade towards selfishness or narcissistic self-admiration or any other presumed cultural pathology one might come up with. Though the impact of narcissism in a culture of hedonism - or however one chooses to picture the modern culture - will be emphasised heavily throughout the treatise. My intention in emphasising individualism is to make explicit to the reader the influence that individualism as an ideal exerts over the basic performance of modern life, by being a principle for perception and conduct generally, and in morality particularly, but also by being itself an idealised end. Furthermore, individualism as life orientation I believe has its source in one very basic human quality without which individualism would not at all have been the same (or perhaps not been at all), and which will be the prime object of investigation throughout this treatise, narcissism. Surely individualism cannot be reduced to narcissism, nor can narcissism be seen as simple individualism. But prior to socio-economic change (progress), socio-cultural change, political change, prior to academic, intellectual and scientific changes, narcissism is the ground of individualism, its first principle so to speak.
The reason for investigating individualism relies, however conventional it may sound, upon a general concern about the modern human condition. Most people seem to agree that in spite of decades of technological, political, economical and social progress modern culture experiences and reflects decay, most dramatically experienced throughout the last 50 60 years. A considerable part of this decay affects the human condition in general and morality in particular, and that is part of what this treatise is set to illuminate individualism and consequently narcissism as the drivetrain of the moral decay of the modern age.
Traditional moral values seem to fail in keeping up with rapid cultural changes and hence fail in providing the modern self with adequate guidance and determination in moral situations. The weakening of the traditional family constellation, the rise of the youth culture with all its frivolousness and rashness does not necessarily signify a less moral society or that we are generally turning immoral altogether. Nor does it with necessity signify moral laziness. Rather it bears witness to a shift in life orientation and specifically in moral focus, perceptibly speaking, away from traditional (moral) values into less extensive concerns in which the self itself seems the most prominent object of attention. In the question about moral perception, to which I will pay significant attention throughout the treatise modern man is more likely to see himself than seeing the Other, where seeing signifies an intentional orientation (phenomenologically speaking) in a levinasian kind of way. The thesis is that the moral significance of the other is not immediately obvious, perceptively speaking, to the moral agent, the others´ face is morally insignificant due to a socially or culturally supported indifference (or also lack of reflection). The primary concern in this respect is that the alteration of moral orientation induces a change of pattern in moral conduct changes in moral perception imply changes in moral performance.
Apart from mere individualism, in what does such moral indifference regarding the value of the Other consist? Why, and exactly how has moral perception and consequently moral performance changed? My thesis is that in the modern, contemporary culture morality fails to include empathy in the form of concern for the Other in moral perception, I take it due to a more basic concern for the Self in the form of narcissism. And furthermore, this imbalance between the concern for the Self and the concern for the Other, however individual-psychologically rooted it may seem to be, is culturally conditioned. Morality is deprived of the concern for the Other in that the moral agent fails to perceive the Other as morally significant due to his lack of empathy.
The two sections into which this treatise is divided concerns 1. Individualism and Narcissism and 2. Empathy, Morality and Recognition respectively. The first section seeks to establish an understanding of the connection between individualism and narcissism and hence prepare the ground for the critique of contemporary culture which I seek to advance, the second to emphasise the importance of empathy as a counterweight to self-concern in moral perception and moral performance and to emphasise the equal importance and value of the Other in moral behaviour and social interaction. This last section is also meant to be a moral account of being-in-the-world-with-others based mainly on Merleau-Ponty and Hegel. | nor |