On the essence of human language : Sketch of a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

Abstract

This paper is a sketch of a reading of Wittgenstein s Philosophical Investigations as a search for the essence of human language. Chapter 1 explores what seems like a positive and what looks like a negative conclusion in the last two sections of the work. The former is a criterion for how to judge whether someone meant such-and-such, and the latter is an exclamation that nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity. Chapter 1 thus explores why it is wrong to call meaning a mental activity, and tries to make sense of the seemingly absurdly strong criterion in the penultimate section. This amounts to an investigation into why Wittgenstein seems to be preoccupied with mental activities, and into his notion of a criterion. According to Wittgenstein, it is a mistake to make philosophy explanatory. Chapter 2 looks into this, and explores what the description that is to take the place of explanation may be. Chapter 3 gives an account of the rejection of the so-called Augustinian concept of the meaning of a word (i.e. the object for which the word stands) as the essence of human language. The major flaw in the so-called Augustinian concept is that it amounts to a sublimation of logic and thus makes it appear as if one doesn t have criteria, e.g. of exactness. Wittgenstein s approach to the matter is then sketched, and it seems clear that a purely descriptive and non-dogmatic philosophy, according to him, only give particular reminders of one s everyday criteria.