| dc.description.abstract | On 24 February 1949 Israel and Egypt signed an armistice agreement. This study analyses how the agreement was drafted in order to find an answer to why this agreement never led to lasting peace in the area. While doing so, focus has been on what impact the changed power balance resulting from the war of 1948 had on the outcome of the armistice agreement; What the position and influence of the acting mediator was during the negotiations; How agreement was reached on the different issues; In what way other actors influenced the outcome of the armistice agreement, and finally, what the direct and indirect consequences of the armistice agreement were?
Not surprisingly, this study shows that a strong imbalance of power in favour of Israel characterises the relations between Israel and Egypt after the war of 1948. This resulted in an agreement on Israeli premises. The common understanding that the armistice agreement was reached exclusively due to the untiring efforts of the UN mediator Ralph Bunche on Rhodes is incorrect. He had to a large extent the potential of a successful mediator but he did not possess the power necessary to make the parties reach an agreement. The negotiations would undoubtedly have broken down but for pressure put on the parties by other actors.
Bunche turned to the UN and the U.S. government for help. Trygve Lie, President Harry S. Truman and the U.S. State Department were actively involved in the negotiations. The Security Council refused to assist Bunche. The U.K. government early made it clear that it did not want to be involved. The influence of these actors strengthened the imbalance of power between the negotiating parties due to the fact that pressure almost exclusively was put on the weaker party, Egypt. As a consequence, the agreement reached was strongly in favour of Israel.
The non-territorial consequences of the negotiations were of crucial importance in the case of Israel. They concern the importance of precedence with regard to further agreements with the Arab states and the question of recognition of the state of Israel.
With regard to the recognition, one may discuss whether Egypt recognised Israel implicitly during these negotiations. This is controversial, as it is commonly understood that Egypt did not recognise the state of Israel until 1978. It has been a well-concealed fact that the Arab-Israeli agreements were negotiated face to face. This study shows that Egypt, by entering into direct negotiations, did recognise the fact that Israel was an entity that it had to interact with. Egypt certainly did not recognise Israel de jure. Whether or not Egypt s actions may be seen as implying de facto recognition is a question of definition.
Bunche had no hope of reaching a just solution in Palestine. According to him, only a less bad solution was achievable. Israel would never have accepted a right or just agreement. What Israel did not accept could not be forced through, given the fact that Israel was undoubtedly the most powerful party in the negotiations. This was made worse because Trygve Lie and the U.S. government to a large extent strengthened Israel s position by backing Israel s demands and applying pressure on Egypt, the weaker party. In the game of right versus might international laws had to step down in favour of power. Egypt had no essential advantages on its side. The agreement had to become a humiliation.
The armistice agreement was not a result of the work of Ralph Bunche. It was mostly reached on the basis of the asymmetrical power balance in the region, both due to Israel s strong position on the ground and due to the fact that Israel s position was increased by the strong support from Lie, Truman and the U.S. State Department. Given the imbalance of power, there was little Bunche could have done to make this agreement contribute to permanent peace in the area. The armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt was dictated by Israel, and Bunche merely played the role of errand boy, putting pressure on the weaker party as demanded by Israel, the USA and Trygve Lie. Such an agreement based solely on the premises of one party can not serve as basis for lasting peace. Although Bunche was aware of the refugee problem and of the fact that Israel had broken international law, the power balance between the parties determined the borders decided upon. It also created the foundations for the state of Israel, the instability in the region, and the lack of basis for lasting peace in the Middle East. | nor |