The Valdres operations : an analysis of German and Norwegian operations in Valdres in the period from April 12th to April 30th 1940

Abstract

Abstract

This dissertation is based on detailed Norwegian and German source material describing the operations in Valdres in 1940. The aim is to throw new light on military professionalism executed in Norwegian units during the operations. The emphasis will especially be put on the Norwegian operations since there is an ongoing debate connected to the Norwegian officer corps and its role in the campaign of 1940. The thesis is that military professionalism or lack of such played a more important role for the outcome of the operations than previously recognised. Through a detailed description of the operation the dissertation discusses the various failures and successes among Norwegian officers. The explanations for success or failure are varied. Those failing cannot be classified according to political belief or lack of military training. On the other hand, success is not identified by rank, prewar experience or later participation in the resistance movement. The conclusion is rather that those who failed could be anywhere on a spectrum running from quislings to highly decorated members of the resistance. Those who solved their tasks with success fill the same spectrum. A general impression, though, is that to many officers were unable to solve their duties when put under pressure. They were not willing to sacrifice what was expected from them when for the first time in their generation they were called upon to do their job for real. The work suggests that lack of military professionalism was more usual among the officers doing active service and among the older reserve officers than among the young reserve officers. It also suggests that the official inquiry commission of 1946, and a majority of later historians and officers discussing the theme have underestimated the possibilities of Norwegian units during the campaign of 1940. Several examples illustrate how those who were willing and had the courage to take command in battle were able to succeed on platoon, company and even battalion level. The higher efficency rate in the participating German units is documented. At the same time it also becomes clear that German commanders on various levels, when put under severe mental pressure on the battlefield, were capable of doing the same mistakes as their Norwegian counterparts. The theory of war as a struggle between opposing wills is again documented.