| dc.description.abstract | International history of the Suez crisis in the summer and autumn of 1956 has tended to focus on the great powers. What has rarely been researched, are the avenues of the impact of the Suez crisis on some smaller Western countries. This thesis will use the Suez crisis as a case study in examining Norway s approach toward an important international crisis and at the same time consider Norway s relations with its most important allies the United States and Great Britain. Further Norway s role as a diplomatic actor and its behaviour within the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) will be scrutinised. The central question addressed is beguilingly simple: What was the principle source and pattern of foreign policy behaviour of Norway during the Suez crisis?
In pursuit of this line of inquiry, I emphasis four issues. To begin with, I offer an analysis based on what I call the coincidence of realpolitik and following the UN path. I understand realpolitik to be the conduct of foreign policy based on calculations of power and the national interest and a focus in the first instance on state s security. By following the UN path I mean that Norway, as a small country, has always emphasised the importance of obeying the UN charter, following international law and to solve conflicts within the framework of the UN. Usually, the two concepts are seen as ambivalent or as a great dilemma in Norwegian foreign policy. This is not my view. Instead, I argue that throughout the Suez crisis Norway could enjoy the fruits of power and realpolitik by ensuring its security by standing shoulder to shoulder with the most important ally within the Western alliance, the United States. At the same time, Norway advanced the principles of the UN, was able to uphold UN integrity and authority, and practice a policy conducive to international law.
Secondly, I argue that the Suez crisis facilitated Norway s role as an actor in the Middle East. I show how Norway could play an important diplomatic role in the UN and on the international arena when its interests deemed it necessary.
Thirdly, this thesis examines the historically rapid contribution of a Norwegian company to the UNEF. Within eleven days after the resolution to establish the UNEF had been passed through the UN General Assembly on November 4, 1956, the first units of a Norwegian company arrived in Egypt. What were the reasons behind this extraordinary speedy deployment of Norwegian troops? How do we explain why Norway contributed with as many as 600 soldiers to a conflict and a region far from Norway s traditional sphere of influence ? Why did the Middle East become such an important issue in Norwegian foreign policy? How can we account for such a policy?
Fourth, I explore the Suez crisis in a broader context and put forward the argument that the Suez crisis marked a watershed in Norwegian British security relations. I argue that within the field of foreign and security policy, the Suez crisis consolidated and fortified a process whereby Norway had found a new and stronger ally as a credible counterweight to Soviet power in the High North.
In approaching the analytical task of examining Norway s approach toward the Suez crisis and its relationship with its most important allies, this thesis draws theoretically on the distinction between the system level,the state level and the individual level of analysis. A line of action of foreign policy is not chosen for one single reason or purpose, foreign policy behaviour is simultaneously a reaction to both external and internal stimuli.
At the individual level, the perceptions, beliefs and motives among key decision-makers, such as Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, UN representative Hans Engen and Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen, determined policy making and Norway s approach toward the Suez crisis.
At the state or domestic level, the important role of the Norwegian Labour Party being in government from 1945 to 1965, with the exception of three weeks in 1963, was significant. Norway s economic developments, the role of pressure groups and public opinion clearly influenced decision-making and Norway s approach to foreign affairs. In 1956, Norway had great maritime interests as one of the worlds leading shipping nations, and the importance of the Suez Canal for Western European economic recovery and development was clearly recognised. Thus, the Norwegian shipowners were an influential pressure group in policy-making, especially up to the outbreak of hostilities on October 29, 1956. One should also take into consideration organisational rivalries and bureaucratic traditions. Clearly, during the Suez crisis, constraints were put on decision making choices, which draws attention to what Graham T. Allison portrays as the outcome of the pulling and hauling of bureaucratic politics that occurs among key participants of the decision process.
However, these aspects alone cannot adequately account for Norwegian foreign policy during the Suez crisis. The primary cause in understanding Norwegian foreign policy during the Suez crisis is found at the international level of analysis.The coincidence of Realpolitik and following the UN path shows how the international system constrained and determined policy making.
Taken together, these different levels of analysis show that several different causes contribute to our understanding of Norway s position during the Suez crisis. Although the causes are related and one does not rule out the other, as pointed out by the eminent historian E.H. Carr, it is essential to establish some hierarchy of causes and decide which should be regarded as the most appropriate in understanding Norwegian foreign policy throughout the Suez crisis. In the final analysis therefore, this thesis holds that security considerations and the importance of following the UN path was predominant and that domestic and individual levels of analysis played a secondary role. At the core of Norwegian policy making was the efforts not to undermine the authority and integrity of the UN, to secure a credible guarantor against external security threats and to ensure the achievement and preservation of sovereignty, territorial integrity and state security. Under these circumstances the underlying objective of the Norwegian government, to ensure credibility and legitimacy in allied defence assurance for the security and independence of Norwegian territory, coincided with a policy of disassociating itself with the dangerous and morally unacceptable policy of the British government,its traditional ally. | nor |