From pragmatic protest to strategic silence? : Norway's policy towards the Russo-Chechen conflict

Abstract

Norwegian governments consistently promote an image of Norway as a “peace nation”, and a human rights advocate throughout the 1990s. The 1990s saw a general optimism after the dissolution of the USSR, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the end of the Cold War. Russo-Norwegian relations were characterized by more openness and the democratic development of the post-Soviet Russia. However, the decade was also marked by one of the most brutal armed conflicts in Europe since the Second World War, i.e. besides the Balkan Wars: In December 1994 Russia invaded Chechnya, one of its own federal republics. This led to two wars between Russia and Chechnya, the first from 1994- 1996. The second war that started in 1999 has been difficult to proclaim an end to, due to constant armed activity. The Russo-Chechen conflict has overall received little attention despite on of the gravest humanitarian situation in the 1990s and 2000s, especially in regards of the massive human rights violations. The quest of the present thesis is to explain a possible discrepancy between Norwegian governments’ presentation of Norway as a “peace nation” and human rights advocate and Norway’s actual conduct in foreign affairs. This postulated discrepancy will be examined in light of how three succeeding Norwegian governments related to the Russo-Chechen conflict. Do Norway’s actual achievements underpin its grand ambitions as human rights promoter and advocate?