Abstract
i
Abstract
In the past decade there has been a series of conflicting
arbitration awards regarding the interpretation of the Most-
Favoured-Nation standard and if it can be extended to dispute
settlement procedure. The analysis suggests that there is an
imperative difference of the outcomes between a teleogical
interpretation of MFN treatment and an objective interpretation
of the respective MFN clauses. While there are many aspects to
consider regarding an expansion of the MFN scope, it is the
contention of this thesis that in the context of procedural
predictability and article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, that the benefits of a teleogical interpretation
against an extension of the MFN standard into procedural
provisions outweighs the benefits of an objective allowing an
extensive interpretation. Furthermore, an analogy to how the
MFN clause is interpreted in international trade law suggests
that it would not be reasonable to expect that an MFN clause
should be extended to dispute settlement provisions if the clause
does not explicitly state that it does extend to such provisions.