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dc.date.accessioned2013-03-12T09:56:40Z
dc.date.available2013-03-12T09:56:40Z
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.date.submitted2002-10-01en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/17287
dc.description.abstractThis paper reports on the empirical properties of the bid auction (buyers propose prices), offer auction (sellers suggest prices) and double auction (both buyers and seller initiate price quotes). These trading institutions are stress-tested using a nonstationary monopolistic market environment in which the buyers' demand schedule and the single seller's supply curve shift unpredictably between trading periods. The principal result is threefold. First, double auction prices tend to be greater than offer auction prices which again tend to be greater than bid auction prices. Second, the listed ranking reflects tendencies only. The laboratory data do not support statistically significant behavioral differences between the three auctions. Third, trading is highly efficient regardless of auction type.nor
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversitetet i Oslo, Økonomisk institutt
dc.relation.ispartofMemorandum fra Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-7118en_US
dc.relation.urihttp://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-7118
dc.subjectSequentialauctionsen_US
dc.subjectexperimentaleconomicsen_US
dc.titleA laboratory stress-test of bid, double and offer auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.date.updated2012-09-14en_US
dc.creator.authorSøberg, Mortenen_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::210en_US
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-3015en_US
dc.type.documentArbeidsnotaten_US
dc.identifier.duo4726en_US
dc.identifier.bibsys021632863en_US
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/17287/1/4726.pdf


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