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dc.date.accessioned2013-03-12T09:54:21Z
dc.date.available2013-03-12T09:54:21Z
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.date.submitted2005-01-10en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/17168
dc.description.abstractIt has often been claimed that firms’ compliance to environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard theory, a result labeled the “Harrington paradox” in the literature. Enforcement data from Norway presented here appears, at first glance, to confirm this “stylized fact”: Firms are inspected less than once a year, detected violators are seldom fined, but still, serious violations seem relatively rare. However, at a closer look, the paradox dissolves: Enforcement of minor violations is lax, but such violations do flourish; serious violations are more uncommon, but such violations are subject to credible threats of harsh punishment. This seems quite consistent with predictions from standard theory. Although our finding may of course apply to Norway only, we argue that the empirical existence of the Harrington paradox is not well documented in the literature. Hence, the claim that firms’ compliance with environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard theory should be viewed with skepticism.nor
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversitetet i Oslo, Økonomisk institutt
dc.relation.ispartofMemorandum fra Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-7118en_US
dc.relation.urihttp://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-7118
dc.titleA dissolving paradox : firms' compliance to environmental regulationen_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.date.updated2012-09-14en_US
dc.creator.authorNyborg, Karineen_US
dc.creator.authorTelle, Kjetilen_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::210en_US
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-10235en_US
dc.type.documentArbeidsnotaten_US
dc.identifier.duo23759en_US
dc.identifier.bibsys050246089en_US
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/17168/1/memo0204.pdf


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