Strategy and Credible Commitment : A game-theoretic analysis of the conflict in Afghanistan

Abstract

This thesis attempts to establish a set of conditions under which the threat or use of force may work against the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan. To answer this question, I model the strategic interaction between the Taliban and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and develop a game-theoretic model, which I analyze under different assumptions regarding the information available to the belligerents.Underlying the model are the two following assumptions: (1) the Taliban will violate the peace only if the expected benefits of the violation exceed the expected costs; and (2) the Taliban’s incentive to violate the peace is curbed only when ISAF conducts a comprehensive and properly-resourced counterinsurgency campaign (referred to in this thesis as the population-centred strategy). For the threat of force to deter the Taliban from peace violation, or for the use of force to compel the Taliban to yield, one of two following conditions must be fulfilled: (1) the Taliban must know (with certainty) that ISAF is committed to the population-centred strategy, or (2) the Taliban must be sufficiently convinced that ISAF has such commitment. The model thus suggests that the credibility of ISAF’s commitment is crucial for the population-centred strategy to be effective against the insurgency.