Matching Strategy and the Development of Military Technology : The Case of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program

Abstract

This study aims at contributing to our understanding of the development of military technology. In the current post-Cold War security environment, the issue of arms races has virtually disappeared, but it seems that matching the development of weapons systems with national security strategies has become more challenging. This is why this thesis proposes to explore how the connexion between military technology and national security strategies is established or loosened. In the light of the striking come-back of nuclear issues in the international agenda, and the development of new delivery systems for those weapons, this study is conducted within the realm of nuclear strategy. The research question is applied to single case-study, the development of Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) in the United States. The analytical tool of this thesis is inspired by an historical intuitionalist approach of military organizations and technology. It relies heavily on the concept of organizational frame, defined as a framework for action that structures how actors identify problems and find solutions. The scientific objective of this thesis is threefold: First, to identify and trace possible processes explaining the creation or the degradation of the link connecting national strategy to the development of military technology; second, to look for adjustments that could improve the validity of existing theories; third, to identify previous factual errors and misunderstanding about SLBM technology. With regards to these three objectives, the main findings of this study are the following. First, the development of SLBM technology was affected by a process of path dependence, which progressively reduced the ability of weapons designers to adapt to changes in U.S. nuclear strategy. Second, competing theories addressing the development of military technology can be included within the same analytical framework, when used to analyse the different steps intervening in a larger historical process. Third, two major misunderstandings about SLBM technology are identified: (a) such missiles were initially developed to perform tactical strikes against military targets, not for deterrent purposes; (b) During the last decade of the Cold War, war-fighting capabilities of SLBMs were greatly overestimated by policy makers, scholars and the public opinion. Nevertheless such capabilities could have been easily developed if the problems posed by nuclear strategy had been recognized by weapons designers.