Skjebnetro, selvutvikling og samfunnsengasjement : den politiske betydningen av ulike former for religiøsitet blant norske velgere

Abstract

Den politiske betydningen av ulike former for religiøsitet<br><br>

Forholdet mellom religion og politikk er tema for avhandlingen til Pål Ketil Botvar. Ved hjelp av data fra norske spørreundersøkelser undersøker han hvordan nyere, østlig-inspirerte religiøsitetsformer påvirker folks politiske holdninger og politiske atferd sammenliknet med kirkesentrert religiøsitet.<br><br>

Utgangspunkt for diskusjonen er teorien om at religion generelt gjennomgår en endring fra tradisjonelle kristne forestillinger over mot en form for subjektiv spiritualitet som gradvis trenger den kirkelige religiøsiteten til side. Analysen av data fra Norsk Monitor viser imidlertid at bildet er mer komplekst enn som så. I henhold til det empiriske materialet finnes det tre hovedformer for religiøsitet i den norske befolkning. Det dreier seg om en kristen-kirkelig og to alternativ-religiøse retninger. Den alternative religiøsiteten er orientert mot reinkarnasjon, astrologi, meditasjon og subjektive religiøse erfaringer.<br><br>

Den kristent-kirkelige religiøsiteten har fortsatt en dominerende posisjon i befolkningen, mens den alternative religiøsiteten ikke fremstår som noen samlet sosial bevegelse. Den fremstår som splittet i to ulike retninger som trekker til forskjellige grupper i befolkningen og har ulike konsekvenser på den politiske arena. Mens den ene retningen er orientert mot selvutvikling og radikale politiske ideer, kjennetegnes den andre av privatisering og mangel på samfunnsengasjement.<br><br>

Doktoranden beskriver hvordan det norske samfunnet de seneste tiårene har beveget seg fra "industrisamfunn" til "post-industrielt samfunn". Frem til ca. 1980 fulgte de tre prosessene industrialisering, urbanisering og spredning av høyere utdanning hverandre. Deretter fant det sted en gradvis nedgang i industrisysselsettingen samtidig som det skjedde en sterk økning i andelen med høyere utdanning. Denne typen samfunnsendringer synes å ha påvirket det kulturelle klimaet for religiøse ytringer og handlinger.. Det strukturelle og kulturelle skiftet ser ut til å gi bedre rammebetingelser for ikke-institusjonelle former for religiøsitet.

How different religious orientations influence political attitudes and behaviour <br><br>

The thesis addresses the relationship between religion and politics, and combines theories on religious change with theories on social capital and political cleavages. <br> Empirical data taken from various polls and surveys conducted in Norway shows that over the last 50 years or so church religiosity has steadily declined while extra-church religiosity related to reincarnation, astrology and individual religious experiences has gained support in the population. Does this mean that alternative religion is becoming more politically relevant at the expense of Christian religion? The main data for this study were taken from the survey project Norwegian Monitor 1985-2005.<br> The research questions are:<br> 1. How have structural processes related to modernisation influenced religious life in Norway?<br> 2. On the basis of survey-data, do we find new forms of religious orientations that differ radically from church-oriented religion? <br> 3. What impact do new and alternative forms of religion have on attitudes towards society and politics?<br><br>

Industrialisation, urbanisation and the spread of higher education are three important processes related to modernisation. For many years these processes followed a parallel line of development. In the 1980s, however, there was a split. The process of urbanisation and the spread of higher education continued; while industrialisation declined and was replaced by a growth in jobs within the service sector. The shift towards a “post-industrial society” has created a cultural climate that seems to be supportive of non-institutional religiosity.<br> Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead (2004) have posited the hypothesis that a silent revolution is taking place where traditional Christian religion is giving way to what they call “spirituality of life”. Another researcher in the field, Lars Ahlin, proposes that new and alternative religion is divided into two parts, both socially and ideologically.<br> My thesis questions the assumption that the individualistic and consumer-oriented New Age movement of the 1980s and 1990s has been replaced by a new religious movement that is concerned with life quality and social questions. According to the data material, three different religious orientations exist side by side in the population. The new term “spirituality” does not incorporate the core elements of the New Age movement of the 1980s. The new spirituality is something that has grown out of both New Age and Christianity. The three concepts “church-religiosity”, “New Age” and “Spirituality” are all needed if we are to capture the whole picture. According to the literature on political cleavages, certain demands have to be fulfilled before a social divide or a conflict develops into a full political cleavage. With respect to alternative religion, the empirical analysis reveals that the main obstacle is related to the lack of a collective ideological platform. Other criteria related to political cleavages are also problematic, such as a distinct social bases and institutionali¬sation. The two forms of alternative religion differ when it comes to social background, social engagement, political attitudes and voting behaviour. The social and political apathy of the New Age phenomenon is somewhat overemphasised in the literature. Although alternative religion does not yet form a full political cleavage, the alternative movement may have indirect influence on the political arena through other institutions in society, such as the churches and the welfare system.