Criminalising Conflict : The International Criminal Court and Northern Uganda

Abstract

This thesis analyses how the issued arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court (ICC) have affected the peace process in northern Uganda. The ICC has only issued arrest warrants for the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord¡¦s Resistance Army (LRA), and not for the Ugandan government. It is argued that this makes it harder for the current peace negotiations to succeed. The presumption is that the LRA will only accept a peace agreement that shields its leaders from prosecution by the ICC.

The thesis detects two trends in the literature; one that understands insurgencies as criminal enterprises and another that argues that insurgencies are politically motivated. The background chapter argues that the arrest warrants alongside other actors have depoliticised or criminalised the LRA. The thesis further argues that the LRA are partially politically motivated, despite its brutality against the civilian population.

By analysing the peace negotiations the thesis finds that the ICC has affected the peace process. It is claimed that the ICC has influenced the issues discussed during the negotiations, and thus made it harder for the parties to reach a peace agreement. However, it discovers that the actors in the peace process have agreed that the northern Ugandan conflict is a political conflict { not only a series of crimes committed by the LRA. The parties have tried to avoid prosecution by the ICC by incorporating an accountability agreement as part of the peace deal. The accountability agreement states that both the Government and the LRA shall be subject to national accountability measures. The agreement provides for alternative accountability mechanisms that are seen to be more pragmatic than trials by the ICC.

The thesis concludes that the ICC has affected the peace negotiations in two ways: 1) The parties have incorporated accountability measures that the parties would not have agreed to without the issuing of arrest warrants. 2) The parties chose national accountability measures over prosecutions by the ICC because it gave the parties an opportunity to incorporate their own interest in the accountability agreement.