Should there be a right to secession in international law? : moral arguments and international law

Abstract

Should there be a right to secession in international law? Moral arguments and international law. The research question for this dissertation has been whether or not there should be a right to secede in international law, and if so, which conditions should apply for such a right? The principle of self-determination is ambiguously formulated in international law. International law on self-determination has been interpreted to grant secession only to overseas colonies, but the implementation of the regulations on self-determination has encompassed recognition of new states when presented with faits accomplis, even when resulting from civil war. The ambiguity of international law is unfortunate in that it may generate violence and fuel conflicts. The question of whether the ambiguity of international law should be remedied by including a right to secede, or alternatively, by not according any groups a right to secede in international law, has been explored by examining moral and practical arguments in favour of, as well as against the idea of a right to secede. A right to secede has been found to be justified for groups displaying one of two characteristics: they are victims of cultural persecution and/or they are suffering massive human rights violations. Some of the arguments against a right to secede provide strong reasons for imposing further conditions on a right to secede. As a result of this discussion, it is the argument of this thesis that a conditional right to secede ought to be inscribed in international law. Human rights violations and/or cultural persecution are suggested as necessary preconditions for a right to secede. Furthermore, territorial base, viability, guarantees of minority protection and commitment to standards for state behaviour for the new state are proposed as conditions to be imposed, further qualifying the right to secede in international law.