Abstract
Nationalism and Foreign policy- the Case of China's Nansha rhetoric
Background:
The Spratly (Nansha) islands in the South China Sea (Nanhai) are today the focal point of a territorial dispute that represents a serious threat to the regional security in Southeast Asia. Six governments - China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei - have laid claims to all or some of the more than 230 islets, reefs and shoals in the Spratly archipelago. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is a key player in the South China Sea conflict.
Focus of study:
The main aim of this thesis is to explore the possible impact of nationalism on China's Spratly policy. Few scholars, however, have discussed the possible mechanisms through which nationalism influences the formulation of China's Spratly policy. This anomaly in the South China Sea literature corresponds with a similar anomaly in the general body of theories covering foreign policy analysis. Few existing theories explicitly address the relationship between nationalism and foreign policy. One of the major challenges in this thesis has been to find a fruitful way to analyse the possible impact of nationalism on foreign policy.
Theoretical approach:
Nationalism is in the thesis defined as an informal ideology and as a legitimating device. It is, however, difficult to decide the extent to which nationalism influence on actual policy. Instead, I have chosen to carry out a preliminary investigation of how the Chinese regime presents its policy to Chinese audiences. In the thesis I discuss the possibility of measuring the relative influence of different independent variables. I criticise Rosenau's attempt to model a general theory that can definitely establish the relative strength of independent variables in the working of foreign policy. Then I outline the theoretical foundations for suggesting a causal relationship between nationalism and foreign policy. Using these foundations as my point of departure, I analyse China's South China Sea discourse in order to reveal if and how nationalism seems to influence foreign policy formulation in this particular case. In the analysis of the discourse, I use the "language as referential structure" and "language as intentional action" approach. Hence, I focus on the role of the agent in the discourse, in opposition to the "language as relational system" approach. My hope is that the thesis, by exploring the role of nationalism in the public discourse in China, have contributed to a better understanding of how nationalism influence on China's actual policy in the Spratly conflict.
Sources:
The thesis analyses 122 articles published in Chinese newspapers and journals between 1988 and 1997, and samples from Chinese books discussing China's foreign policy challenges in the next century. The articles are divided into two categories; the journals and books is mainly analysed as elite communication, while the newspapers is analysed as an expression of the regime's official political rhetoric.
Principal findings:
The South China Sea-discourse in China centres around four subjects: resources, the activities of others, security and the historical basis for China's claims. In the journals, authors express their views on the Spratly conflict in nationalist terms. However, in sum their perceptions seem to be influenced more by an assertive or affirmative type of nationalism than a more aggressive one. The regime's official rhetoric is also influenced by a moderate form of nationalism. Only on certain occasions does the regime use a more aggressive language. However, the articles discussing the Spratly conflict do not appear frequently enough in the main newspapers to be considered a part of an official nationalist campaign. Allan S. Whiting (1995) argues that only aggressive nationalism may influence the foreign policy output. Hence, based on the conclusion in this thesis, China is not likely to act in ways that should cause war in the South China Sea in the near future. This indicates that China's hard/soft policy in the Spratly conflict is not a delaying tactic employed by the regime while it is waiting for the opportunity to launch a strike in the South China Sea. Rather, this policy could be an expression of a disagreement in the leadership on what course China should follow.