| dc.description.abstract | The purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the
domestic (Political Liberalism) and the international (Law of Peoples)
theories of John Rawls, paying special attention to the concepts of
tolerance and human rights.
In Political Liberalism, Rawls argues that we are to tolerate persons,
and groups of persons, within a liberal society as long as they adhere
to comprehensive doctrines that affirm democratic essentials. In The
Law of Peoples, however, he claims that we should tolerate a certain
kind of illiberal states, labeled decent hierarchical societies,
granted they meet certain conditions. Most notably, they observe what
Rawls refers to as universal human rights.
Drawing on some of Rawls's critics (Pogge, Tan, Tesón), I attempt to
show that there are important differences between tolerating an
illiberal doctrine within the borders of a liberal state, and
tolerating illiberal states as such, and that Rawls is incorrect in
viewing the two cases as analogous (at least with regard to tolerance).
Tolerating the kind of illiberal states defined in The Law of Peoples
will put unreasonable burdens on the shoulders of dissenters in these
societies. As it turns out, Rawls's universal human rights are not
very extensive. Most strikingly, the freedom of speech is lacking from
his list. This raises the question of how we are to conceive the moral
significance of human beings if we legitimate the hardships invoked on
persons that oppose the dominating doctrine within decent hierarchical
societies.
On this background, I challenge the moral conception of the person
that Rawls applies, and present a wider such conception, claiming that
all individuals ought to be secured a richer list of human rights,
containing minimally the freedom of speech.
Further, I argue that Rawls's answer to how we are to understand
individual freedom and equality seems to imply that liberal and decent
hierarchical societies are equal, in moral terms, and that no case is
made for liberalism.
This argument, if successful, implies at least two things: a) the
argument can be seen as part of a broader attack against cultural
relativism in the human rights debate, and, more specifically, b) the
argument will challenge the credibility of Rawls's conclusions. To put
it another way: If my argument is sound, I see no way that Rawls's
position lies within the confines of liberal tolerance.
My conclusion is that the notion of tolerance that Rawls relies on is
self-defeating in that it allows for a limitation of human rights on
the part of members of hierarchical societies (most notably its
dissenters) that seems unacceptable, at least to committed liberals.
Tolerance as interpreted by Rawls, seems to rest on a moral conception
of the person that implies that individuals are not free and equal in
a wide, liberal sense. The extent of their freedom parallels (at best)
the limited notion of universal human rights.
Freedom and equality in Political Liberalism is seen as contingent on
a preexisting fact of democracy. Members of other societies are not
free and equal because their society is not democratic. Therefore,
Rawls's liberal contractual argument seems to have a restricted scope.
Due to this, it seems that the theory is more likely to legitimate
regression in liberal societies, than improvement in hierarchical ones.
This being said, I have no problems seeing that Rawls has a major
point when he stresses the importance of understanding among peoples.
The problem is that mutual understanding and respect, on his view,
implies tolerating decent hierarchical societies in which human beings
are deprived of rights that we ourselves value. The question is
whether or not Rawls's goal overrides a liberal aim of achieving
freedom and equality for all. | nor |