Abstract
"INSTITUTIONALISING CO-OPERATION. A STUDY OF THE ELYSÉE TREATY AND FRANCO-GERMAN CO-OPERATION 1963-93"
In 1963, France and Germany completed 'The Franco-German Treaty on Organization and Principles of Co-operation', the so-called Elysée Treaty. The Elysée Treaty, and its protocols, are in this study viewed as a political institution, hence the Elysée Treaty will be referred to as the Franco-German institution. This study seeks to answer the question of how the Franco-German institution has changed from 1963 to 1993, and to analyse the dynamics of change?
The study is a theoretically informed empirical study in which an institutional perspective is applied on political processes. It is argued that Franco-German institutional change can best be understood by an examination of the triad relationship between characteristics of the individuals, context and the Franco-German institution itself. In order to study this interplay, attention is directed towards different characteristics of each of the three analytical levels. No characteristic is treated as exogenously given, instead, they are all treated as endogenous processes. Three different kinds of dynamics of institutional change are identified: internal dynamics, exogenous shocks and reform attempts by chief-executives.
Through an examination of documents, interviews, press-archives as well as various secondary sources the development of the Franco-German institution is analysed. Five different periods are identified, which all was dominated by a different dynamic of change. The process of constructing the Franco-German institution in 1963 was primarily a result of the intentions and actions of the chief-executives. Few persons were involved in the process and Adenauer and de Gaulle had the necessary authority and autonomy to be able to initiate and conclude the Elysée Treaty. The construction of the institution was not a result of international determinism, nor an automatic extension of existing European co-operation.
During the process of ratifying the Elysée Treaty the chief-executives became less influential on its course of development. Instead, a conjuncture of events and temporal structures heavily affected the outcome. The specific outcome of the process of ratification can thus better be understood to result from a simultaneity of political events and political processes than intentional choice and design.
Since the ratification ended with the adoption of a preamble which contradicted the Elysée Treaty, the Erhard government could legitimately pursue a policy along the lines of the preamble. The Erhard government thus deliberately limited the scope of the Franco-German institution during the mid-1960s. Even if Kiesinger and de Gaulle wanted to achieve progress in the Franco-German institution throughout the decade they were unable to transform the institution into a vehicle for comprehensive political co-operation. Instead, the Franco-German institution developed within the institutional constraints left by the Preamble and the experiences from the Erhard government. During the period of Brandt and Pompidou these constraints became taken for granted and were not seriously challenged. However, close Franco-German co-operation in various less politicised fields such as technology became taken for granted among the central participants and frequent consultations became habituated.
During the Schmidt-Giscard era the processes of institutional change were dominated by different dynamics. The Energy Crisis in 1973 was an external dramatic shock to the Franco-German institution which triggered major institutional changes. The Energy Crisis challenged both the efficiency and legitimacy of national policies in an interdependent world. The chief-executives endeavoured to redefine the institution, not only governing within the institutional constraints but by governing the constraints themselves. During the decade new problems, participants and solutions were introduced to the institution. The institutional robustness produced by networks, experiences and routines served to cement the redefinition of the Franco-German institution .
Throughout the 1980s the changes in the Franco-German institution primarily resulted from the internal dynamic offered by the structures established in the 1970s. The comprehensive set of networks, committees, projects and routines not only offered institutional stability but contributed to steadily produce incremental changes. A close Franco-German co-operation took place in nearly every field and there were both internal and external expectations for progress. The institutional robustness which resulted from the increased institutionalisation was important for the moderate changes which have taken place after the German unification. Despite the dramatic nature of this event it has not led to immediate changes in the Franco-German institution.
In the final chapter the implications the empirical material have had for the theoretical assumptions are discussed. The discussion is concentrated around four main topics. Firstly, the period-specific dynamic. Here it is important to demonstrate that no level of analysis should be omitted from the institutional model of analysis. Secondly, the role of governance is discussed. It is demonstreted that governance is not only an act of defining and pursuing national objectives, but that the creation and cultivation of values are of equal importance for the chief-executives. Thirdly, since the empirical material suggests that there has been a normality of institutional change and an abnormality of dramatic institutional change, the role of institutional stability and adaptability are discussed. Finally, some words are said about the process of institutionalising co-operation itself.