| dc.description.abstract | European integration in the economic sphere get increasing influence on the nation states ability to run autonomous welfare policies. The point of departure of this study is the persistent incongruence in the European integration process between the implementation of the internal market and the fact that welfare and social policy still is formally the responsibility of the single member states. I have confronted this with empirical data from the process aiming at creating a single market for supplementary pensions in the EU.
As the economic integration in Europe is deepening, the EU now plays a significant role in public goods provision, market regulation and macroeconomic stabilisation. Pension expenditure already accounted for 12% of the EU GDP in 1995. This is almost entirely financed by tax on labour income (pay-as-you go). Reasonable projections predict the burden of pensions to be well above 20% of the EU GDP within a few decades. The Stability and Growth Pact signed by the parties to establish the Economic and Monetary Union, which limits the size of deficit/ GDP ratios, will force Member States to raise taxes considerably to finance the future pension outlays. There is no reason per se to define supplementary pensions as an area for EU involvement, but it has been brought to the attention of the EU from the goal of achieving free movements for capital and labour. Supplementary pension arrangements can be seen as the link between a free market for capital and a free labour market.
This study analyses the process of creating a regulatory regime for pension funds in the EU. The process can be traced back to 1990, and is still not completed. A decade is not a particularly long time for a decision making process at the European level. But this process was expected to pass more smoothly. By analysing a policy-making process in the European Union, I want to achieve some general knowledge about the nature of European integration. The aim is to contribute with some issue specific analyses related to the integration in economic policy versus national sovereignty in welfare politics. By this case study, one can illuminate some larger questions like what competencies should be brought to the EU from the nation states, why and how? Even if all Member States face similar challenges related to problems of financing future pension expenditures, one could still emphasise a national approach to the challenges.
I have chosen to focus on the views of five Member States: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Denmark. But even though I discuss particular features of their national pension systems, this is not a comparative study of pension politics, but of dynamics in European integration, with pensions as the empirical field.
I approach the question of the relation between the decision-making process and its outcome from three different theoretical perspectives. I do not see them as competing perspectives, but rather as complementary approaches that can contribute to a better understanding of the question.
The first is actor-oriented: Nation states are seen as the main actors, and outcomes are explained as outputs of inter-state bargaining.
The second is structure oriented and focus the role of the formal as well as informal institutional procedures and norms of the EU system, with special emphasis on the Member States capability of changing interests and on institutional learning.
The third is a political economy perspective that places economic interests in broader historical and economic traditions, and within national state-society relations.
The analysis shows that the difficulties in reaching a compromise are largely due to the different approaches the Member States have to this issue, on whether supplementary pensions should be regarded as a part of the (national) welfare politics or as a part of the (European) capital markets. Furthermore, the Commission has played an important role in framing the issue, and underscoring the importance of getting pensions in line with the treaty provisions in order to create a truly free capital market. So far, they have not succeeded. | nor |