| dc.description.abstract | This thesis provides a rational analysis of the strategic motivations underlying the 2019 Japan–South Korea dispute. Utilizing game theory, the dispute is represented through various models, each highlighting different aspects and assumptions. The first model explores the strategic challenges that favor escalation and unilateral gains, leading to difficulty in resolving the conflict. In the next model Japan’s actions are perceived as an implicit threat designed to shape future interactions. This necessitates credible follow-through, thereby potentially influencing South Korea’s future decisions. Finally a two-level game is considered examining domestic constraints on international negotiation. The model demonstrates that actions deemed irrational at the international level can be rational when considering domestic-level payoffs. It also shows how domestic factors, under imperfect information, can contribute to the breakdown of negotiations. Additionally, the thesis introduces the the Python library StratPy that was developed in conjunction with this thesis in order to model and analyze the game-theoretical models, and was made to be especially accommodating to political scientists. | eng |