| dc.description.abstract | This master thesis focuses on the U.S. policy on NATO enlargement during the George H.W. Bush administration from 1989 until the beginning of the Bill Clinton administration in 1993. This thesis analyses when the thinking on NATO eastward enlargement incorporating former allies of the Soviet Union emerged and discusses how this thinking evolved during the Bush administration. This thesis also discusses why the Bush administration wanted to enlarge NATO, arguing that there were both economic and geopolitical underlying drivers for enlarging the Atlantic Alliance. In contrast to earlier research on the topic, this thesis argues, based on recently declassified documents, that the idea of enlarging NATO eastward emerged early on in the Bush administration. Moreover, this thesis puts forward the theoretical concept of hedging, arguing that in its NATO enlargement policy, the Bush administration was simultaneously balancing and engaging the Soviet Union/Russia. By pursuing the dualistic strategy of hedging, the Bush administration safeguarded itself in case the development in Russia would go in an undesirable direction. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the Bush administration favoured the enlargement of NATO for pragmatic and realpolitik reasons, seeing it as a way of preserving the U.S. dominant position in Europe and preventing other security structures from emerging in Europe. | eng |